Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume XXXI: Winter by David Sedley

By David Sedley

Oxford stories in historical Philosophy is a quantity of unique articles on all features of historical philosophy. The articles can be of considerable size, and contain severe notices of significant books. OSAP is released two times each year, in either hardback and paperback. "Unique price as a set of remarkable contributions within the quarter of historical philosophy."--Sara Rubinelli, Bryn Mawr Classical evaluation

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64 This passage from the Theaetetus is admittedly late, but since it accords well with the earlier passages just quoted, and since the tendency in Plato’s own thought is if anything away from regarding definitions as mere statements of meaning, of what anyone must know in order to understand definienda (in an everyday semantic Socrates’ Demand for Definitions 27 Second, Plato gives us strong evidence that what counts for Socrates as an adequate definition is a mere statement of meaning, a mere statement of what anyone must know in order to understand the definiendum (in an everyday semantic sense of ‘understand’).

223 b; Theaet. 196 d–e. An earlier generation of scholars, including Robinson and Geach, took Socrates’ commitment to these two principles in the early dialogues to be pretty obvious (as indeed it is). Subsequently, much ink has been spilt by scholars attempting to show that he is not in fact committed to them there, largely with a view to freeing him from certain unpalatable consequences which have been thought to follow from them, such as the illegitimacy, given his constant denials that he can define X-ness, of his frequent assumptions in the course of elenctic cross-examinations that he has insights about X-ness and about what particular things have X-ness (see especially G.

Ma. 304 d–e; Euthph. 4 d–5 d, 6 e, 15 d; Chrm. 176 a–b; Lys. 223 b; Theaet. 196 d–e. An earlier generation of scholars, including Robinson and Geach, took Socrates’ commitment to these two principles in the early dialogues to be pretty obvious (as indeed it is). Subsequently, much ink has been spilt by scholars attempting to show that he is not in fact committed to them there, largely with a view to freeing him from certain unpalatable consequences which have been thought to follow from them, such as the illegitimacy, given his constant denials that he can define X-ness, of his frequent assumptions in the course of elenctic cross-examinations that he has insights about X-ness and about what particular things have X-ness (see especially G.

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